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Abstract 
After decades of brutal dictatorship under Saddam Hussein and years of sectarian civil war, 
followed by the 2014 ISIS take over, and subsequent loss, of territory in the north and west of 
the country, Iraq’s institutions and people are still reeling. Though post-war reconstruction is 
now underway and the numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Iraq are gradually 
decreasing, there remain almost two million displaced people scattered throughout the country. 
Over half of these IDPs have been displaced for more than three years.
The contemporary displacement landscape in Iraq is both problematic and unique. Protracted 
displacement has become entrenched as a norm, with state response to date emphasising 
return as the only desirable solution. Complicating the search for durable solutions is the 
ongoing conflict between the government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government, over 
the resource-rich Disputed Territories, which are historically the most ethno-religiously diverse 
region of Iraq. Additionally, the presence of perceived ISIS-affiliates among the IDP population 
renders implementation of durable solutions extremely challenging, whilst simultaneously 
raising unique protection concerns as these perceived affiliates remain extremely vulnerable to 
abuse and discrimination by state and security forces, as well as civilians.
In 2008 the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration published a national policy on 
displacement, which was never implemented. At the time, on paper, it represented a relatively 
robust mechanism for protection. It is, however, inadequate to respond to the current 
displacement context within Iraq, particularly the protection needs of minorities within the 
Disputed Territories and perceived-ISIS affiliates. This research examines the contents of the 
policy against the current protection needs of IDPs, before exploring how it can be updated, and 
made relevant, by drawing upon the effective, holistic provisions contained within the African 
Union Kampala Convention. 
Keywords  Iraq; displacement; ISIS; extremism; protection 
The Internal Displacement Research Programme (IDRP) is a specialised programme of the Refugee Law Initiative
Contents
1. Introduction 3
2. Analytic Framework 5
3. Methodology 8
4. The Complexities of IDP Protection in Iraq  9
4.1 The Displacement landscape in Iraq: Protracted displacement as the norm 9
4.2 Protection needs unique to Iraq 10
4.3 Perceived ISIS-affiliates 11
4.4 Minorities and the Disputed Territories 13
4.5 Iraqi state response to displacement to date 15
5. Iraq’s 2008 National Policy on Displacement – A Missed Opportunity 17
5.1 The Guiding Principles in the Iraqi displacement context 17
5.2 The 2008 Iraq National Policy on Displacement: An overview 19
5.3 Reasons for the failure of Iraq’s 2008 National Policy on Displacement 21
6. Aligning Iraq’s National Policy on Displacement with Contemporary Protection Needs 23
6.1 The Kampala Convention: a brief overview 23
6.2 Prevention of Displacement: Lessons from Kampala 24
6.3 A holistic approach to durable solutions: return is not enough 25
7. Conclusion and Recommendations 28
8. Bibliography 30
Extremism, Contexted Territory and Diversity: Iraq’s National Policy on Displacement 3
1. Introduction
After decades of brutal dictatorship under Saddam Hussein, years of sectarian civil war triggered 
by the 2003 U.S-led coalition invasion, followed by the 2014 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
occupation and subsequent loss of territory in the north and west of the country, Iraq’s insti-
tutions and people are still reeling. Though post war reconstruction is now underway and the 
numbers of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in Iraq are gradually decreasing,1 there remain 
almost two million displaced people scattered throughout the country. Over half of these IDPs 
have been displaced for more than three years.2 Many Iraqi IDPs currently enduring situations of 
protracted displacement are relying increasingly on negative coping mechanisms ‘such as reduc-
ing meals, borrowing money, and in worst cases, resorting to child labour, prostitution, organ 
sale and begging’,3 demonstrating that protection needs are not being met. 
The legacy (and existence) of ISIS in Iraq significantly exacerbates an already challenging dis-
placement context. The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs 
(OCHA) identifies those IDPs perceived as being extremist-affiliates as ‘the most vulnerable 
beneficiaries that humanitarians serve’,4 evidencing this assertion by pointing to the fact that IDP 
communities containing suspected extremists and supporters of extremism are often subjected 
to raids by security forces, as well as arbitrary arrest and detention. OCHA has also described how 
‘women and children whose [male relatives] are accused of being…[ISIS]-affiliates can face grave 
consequences.’5 Many contemporary returnees are perceived as ISIS affiliates and acts of revenge 
are being carried out against both people and property as these individuals return.6 
The contemporary displacement landscape in Iraq is both problematic and unique. Protracted 
displacement has become entrenched as a norm, with state response to date emphasising re-
turn as the only desirable solution. Complicating the search for durable solutions, is the ongoing 
conflict between the government of Iraq and the Kurdish Regional Government over the re-
source-rich Disputed Territories, which are historically the most ethno-religiously diverse region 
of Iraq. Additionally, the presence of perceived ISIS-affiliates among the IDP population renders 
implementation of durable solutions extremely challenging. 
In 2008 the Iraqi Ministry of Displacement and Migration published a national policy on displace-
ment, which was never implemented. At the time, on paper, it represented a relatively robust 
mechanism for protection. It is however inadequate to respond to the current displacement 
context within Iraq, particularly the protection needs of minorities within the Disputed Territo-
ries and perceived-ISIS affiliates. The existing 2008 NPD is one of only two in the Middle East,7 but 
whilst rendered obsolete by dysfunctional bureaucracy, this accolade is meaningless. Iraq cur-
rently has a real opportunity to set a positive precedent for IDP protection by formulating prag-
matic durable solutions which incorporate non-discriminatory protection provisions, and which 
take a preventative approach to future displacement.
1  Nancy Riordan reports that in 2015, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that the number of IDPs in Iraq had risen 
to 4 million: see Riordan, (2016), Internal Displacement in Iraq: Internally Displaced Persons and Disputed Territory, New England Journal of Public 
Policy, 28 (2), p1. This 2015 internal displacement figure of 4 million has since decreased to a 2019 displacement figure of 1.8 million. See: United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (February 2019), Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan: January – December 2019, 
p6.
2  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (November 2018), Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, p7.
3  Higel L, (2016), Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Security and Protection, Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group Interna-
tional, p5.
4  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (November 2018), Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, p22.
5  Ibid.
6  Ibid.
7  The other Policy being Yemeni. See Nicolau I & Pagot A, (2018), ‘Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement: Global Adoption and 
Gaps’, Forced Migration Review, 59, p9.
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With the above-mentioned opportunity in mind, this research examines the contents of the NPD 
against the current protection needs of IDPs, before exploring how it can be updated, and made 
relevant, by drawing upon the effective, holistic provisions contained within the 2010 African 
Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the 
Kampala Convention). Very little existing academic literature examines the case for updating 
Iraq’s NPD, and no other literature approaches the subject via identification of lessons that can 
be learned from the Kampala Convention. 
Due to the entrenched protracted displacement currently experienced by Iraqi IDP communi-
ties, this paper will employ a critical durable solutions-based theoretical framework as a means 
through which to examine how the Kampala Convention can be utilized in order to develop 
Iraq’s NPD. Whilst doing so, this paper will also draw from the 2004 Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement (GPs). The GPs are of particular normative importance due to their status as the 
primary international instrument for IDP protection. Unlike refugees, IDPs do not benefit from 
the provisions of an internationally legally binding convention. Rather, the GPs can be catego-
rized as ‘soft law’: though not legally binding as a stand-alone instrument, they direct parties 
to legally binding provisions within existing international human rights and humanitarian law 
which are relevant and applicable for the protection of IDPs. In contrast, the Kampala Conven-
tion is a legally binding instrument, but applicable to African states only, though it is able to set 
precedents, which over time may develop international traction and transform into international 
norms. The Kampala Convention is renowned as an extremely effective instrument because it 
employs a holistic approach to protection, employing a preventative, rather than purely reac-
tionary, response to displacement. 
The needs of IDPs in Iraq are many, particularly as protracted displacement becomes entrenched 
as the norm rather than the exception. However, this paper will focus specifically on the protec-
tion needs of two groups of people whose displacement within the current Iraqi context makes 
them exceptionally vulnerable: perceived ISIS affiliates and minorities; especially minorities 
originating from Nineveh and other areas within the Disputed Territories. The focus on these two 
categories of IDP is not to privilege the protection needs of these groups, but rather to highlight 
the distinct challenges the Iraqi state faces in ensuring adequate protection and realistic durable 
solutions for all IDPs in Iraq. After careful analysis of both the Kampala Convention and the GPs, 
this paper will argue that by incorporating provisions from the Kampala Convention, rather than 
the GPs, Iraqi authorities can, and should, create a relevant and robust NPD for Iraq. 
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2. Analytic Framework
This research focuses on protection-based durable solutions to protracted displacement within 
a very specific context: that characterized by disputed territory, presence of a diverse array of 
minority groups and deep trauma resulting from recent ISIS-occupation of a large section of ter-
ritory. These factors are interrelated, largely because a wide array of minorities originate from the 
Nineveh Plains, an area within Nineveh governorate, which in turn is located within the Disputed 
Territories of Iraq; an area which was occupied by ISIS. The crimes against minorities that ISIS 
committed have left many living in a situation of protracted displacement, remaining too fearful, 
or unable to return home.8 Additionally, as Nancy Riordan points out, the post-ISIS conflict over 
the Disputed Territories [also] inhibits IDP return and prolongs destabilization,9 further contribut-
ing to an atmosphere fuelled by tension, mistrust and discontent.
In  response to these empirical factors, the analytic framework this research employs is a critical 
approach to durable solutions, defined by recognition of the inadequacies inherent within the 
three traditionally recognised durable solutions to displacement (sustainable return and rein-
tegration; sustainable local integration in host community; and resettlement and sustainable 
integration into the new host community),10 combined with the need for formulation of policies 
and approaches which address displacement in a bottom-up, participatory manner. It is here 
that the Kampala Convention proves instructive, demonstrating that such academic recommen-
dations can be successfully transferred to legislative practice. The drafters of the Convention 
adopted a broad-based participatory approach to its creation, thus enabling the incorporation 
of grassroots concerns and critique of an institutionalised, top-down approach to identification 
of priorities and solutions.11 Furthermore, the Kampala Convention emphasizes the fundamental 
role of collective, socio-economic rights in securing peace and sustainable solutions, which rep-
resents a departure from UN-formulated conventions and responses, which often prioritize civil 
and political rights.
Compounding the situation of entrenched protracted displacement in Iraq, is the lack of policy 
formulation, or even political will, on the part of the Government of Iraq (GoI), Kurdish Regional 
Government (KRG), or international stakeholders to objectively encourage integration into host 
communities as a durable solution. Rather, the aforementioned actors have consistently focused 
exclusively upon return as the sole solution available to IDPs,12 despite the fact that many IDPs 
do not want to pursue this option. This problematic feature of state response to displacement is 
exacerbated in Iraq by the tendency of contemporary Iraqi IDPs to view security in terms of eth-
no-sectarian homogeneity.13 Such a perception of safety clearly complicates durable solutions 
involving integration if the host community is not part of the same ethno-sectarian social group 
as the IDP, and clearly indicates the need for organized, community-led reconciliation initiatives 
as well as freedom of movement and freedom to choose place of residence.
It is clear that integrative durable solutions have been underexplored in the Iraqi displacement 
8  Mixed Migration Platform, (27th April 2017: Round 1), ‘IDP Perceptions in Northern Iraq’, Mixed Migration Platform and Ground Truth 
Solutions, p3 and United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (November 2018), ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Over-
view 2019’, p4.          
9  Riordan N, (2016), ‘Internal Displacement in Iraq: Internally Displaced Persons and Disputed Territory’, New England Journal of Public 
Policy, 28 (2), Article 10, p1.
10  Inter-Agency Standing Committee Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons (2010), https://www.unhcr.
org/50f94cd49.pdf 
11  Kamungi P, (2010), ‘Beyond Good Intentions: Implementing the Kampala Convention’, Forced Migration Review, p53.
12  Siddiqui N, (2018), ‘Balancing the Rights of Displaced, Returning and Remaining Populations: Learning from Iraq’, Forced Migration 
Review, 53, p64.
13  Norwegian Refugee Council & Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), (December 2013), ‘Internal Displacement in Iraq: 
Barriers to Integration’, NRC / IDMC joint published with International Organization on Migration (IOM), p16.
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context, in favour of unsupported return,14 despite a large body of refugee scholarship advo-
cating precisely for integrative solutions to displacement. Roger Zetter and Katy Long make a 
poignant observation which is consistently overlooked by the Iraqi authorities and internation-
al stakeholders: ‘People are unwilling to return as long as high levels of insecurity and weak or 
non-existent governance persist; host communities resist local integration; and resettlement is 
an option only for a few.’15 Thus, Zetter and Long point to the need for a flexible, experimental, 
and politically risky approach to displacement, which incorporates the informal coping and 
survival strategies of IDPs, and allows for, or supports, secondary migration.16 This academic 
recommendation reflects a central theme of the Kampala Convention, which emphasises the 
need for participation of IDPs in displacement response. Moreover, the Convention recognizes 
the importance of socio-economic rights, which are often the driving force behind de facto inte-
gration; independent integration which often occurs through IDPs pursuing informal livelihood 
strategies.17   
Karen Jacobsen builds upon Zetter and Long’s suggestions for addressing displacement by 
employing a livelihoods lens through which to view displacement situations. Just as Zetter and 
Long recognise that IDPs engage in informal, temporary migration as they seek their own dura-
ble solutions to their displacement, Jacobsen identifies the fact that in seeking jobs and income 
opportunities, IDPs are ‘increasingly likely to end up in urban areas rather than camps.’18 This is 
certainly the case in Iraq, where seventy one per cent of IDPs reside outside of camps,19 forty 
per cent of whom are in need of protection assistance.20 Jacobsen therefore argues that in inner 
cities, everyone, IDPs as well as the host community, struggles to meet the same basic needs, 
as they are confronted with the same ‘structural problems associated with urban poverty’. This 
structural violence makes it difficult for individuals to secure adequate housing, sufficient food 
and clean water, access to healthcare, and education for their children.21 
Like Zetter and Long, Jacobsen too calls for an approach to displacement which recognises and 
incorporates the informal survival strategies of IDPs, as opposed to a top-down implementa-
tion of rigid policy which fails to consider reality on the ground or IDP perspectives. In doing so, 
Jacobsen advocates for the use of a livelihoods framework which ‘comprises an analysis of the 
assets and strategies refugees [and IDPs] use to achieve desired outcomes, and the institutional, 
or structural context…which constrains or enables these strategies.’22 Within this framework, the 
outcomes of any interventions for the host community also play an integral role, and so, any at-
tempt to address displacement should also improve the socio-economic conditions for the host 
community, or it cannot be considered durable. It can therefore be seen that the response to 
displacement advocated by Jacobsen mitigates the observation made by Zetter and Long; that 
host communities often resist integration of IDPs, and again provides an insight into the salience 
of collective, socio-economic rights.
Aside from informal coping strategies and socio-economic considerations for both IDPs and host 
communities, which are often overlooked by traditional approaches to durable solutions, an 
additional barrier to sustainability of solutions not mentioned thus far, is provided by Geraldine 
14  United Nations General Assembly, (5th April 2016), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons on his Mission to Iraq’, A/HRC/32/35/Add.1, Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Agenda Item 3, p17 – 18.
15  Ibid, p34.
16  Ibid.
17  Zetter R and Long K, (2012), Unlocking Protracted Displacement, Forced Migration Review, 40, pp34-37.
18  Jacobsen K, (2006), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Urban Areas: A Livelihood Perspective, Journal of Refugee Studies, 19 (3), p273.
19  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (November 2018), ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 
2019’, p16.               
20  Ibid, p21.
21  Jacobsen K, (2006), Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Urban Areas: A Livelihood Perspective, Journal of Refugee Studies, 19 (3), p276.
22  Ibid, p279.
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Chatelard. Chatelard convincingly argues that ‘[n]othing short of genuine peacebuilding and 
reconciliation efforts will create the conditions for [erasure]…of displacement’23 no matter how 
much IDP response is mainstreamed into development. Nadia Siddiqui concurs, highlighting 
the absolute need for broad implementation of social cohesion and peacebuilding program-
ming across affected communities: returnees, communities of return, host communities, as well 
as those still living in displacement,24 if protracted displacement is to be solved sustainably. 
Since the 2003 U.S invasion and subsequent sectarian war, followed by the occupation of huge 
swathes of territory by ISIS, Iraqi social cohesion is in tatters. Peacebuilding and reconciliation 
initiatives will be fundamental to ensuring the success of any attempts at durable solutions, but 
they should not be prioritized above socio-economic development of entire host communities 
as an integrative measure. Rather, a dual strategy of community socio-economic development 
and service provisions should be employed alongside long-term peacebuilding and reconcilia-
tion initiatives if integration is to be successfully achieved. 
Given the extreme vulnerability of IDPs who are perceived ISIS-affiliates and the severe trauma 
that certain post-ISIS communities continue to suffer, for ethical reasons, this research makes no 
attempt to identify the presence of actual ISIS-affiliates within the Iraqi displaced population. 
Instead, the focus throughout this paper will remain upon how protection-based durable solu-
tions can be achieved which incorporate perceived ISIS-affiliates and which address the ongoing 
conflict over the Disputed Territories, which disproportionately effects minority IDPs. It is increas-
ingly clear that for IDPs who fled ISIS, as well as those perceived as ISIS-affiliates, return is not an 
option. 
23  Ibid, p18.
24  Siddiqui N, (2018), ‘Balancing the Rights of Displaced, Returning and Remaining Populations: Learning from Iraq’, Forced Migration 
Review, 53, p65.
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3. Methodology
This research undertook an entirely desk-based, qualitative approach to reviewing primary and 
secondary-source literature produced by journalists, scholars, practitioners, Non-governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), inter-governmental organizations and government bodies. Humanitarian 
reports and needs assessments produced by NGOs were heavily relied upon in order to identify 
those protection needs currently being met and those which are not. Wherever possible, reports 
were sought which had employed a participatory approach, enabling this research to incorpo-
rate IDP perspectives concerning desires, needs, perceptions and experiences. These humanitar-
ian reports provided a contextual and factual framework in the form of primary data from which 
to analyse and develop theory as provided by practitioners and scholars.
The GPs and Kampala Convention were analysed and applied to the Iraqi context in order to as-
certain whether the Iraqi NPD can usefully adopt provisions and approaches from either instru-
ment. The Kampala Convention, specifically, is more holistic in its approach to protection, and 
thus more adept at dealing with a complicated displacement landscape, including the nuances 
of conflict and extremism as they interact with displacement. The GPs were used as a guide for 
desirable protection provision, but they did represent a protection ceiling, due to the fact that 
the Kampala Convention surpasses them in terms of protection during all stages of displace-
ment, including prevention. 
The primary ethical concern regarding this research relates to the presence of ISIS in Iraq and 
the perception (or misperception) among many Iraqis that IDPs from previously ISIS-held areas 
who have not yet returned home are ISIS affiliates. Presenting data that evidences the presence 
of ISIS-affiliates among IDP populations would be problematic as it could result in state refusal to 
provide protection and assistance for all IDPs originating from certain areas, all IDPs of a certain 
population demographic, or lead to increased harassment of IDPs by security actors. This con-
cern is largely mitigated, however, by the fact that the aim of this research is neither to prove, nor 
disprove, the existence of ISIS-affiliates among IDP populations. The presence of such extrem-
ist-affiliates for the purpose of this research is largely irrelevant, as it is the protection concerns 
that arise from people’s perceptions which will be focused upon.
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4. The Complexities of IDP Protection in Iraq 
4.1 The Displacement landscape in Iraq: Protracted displacement as 
the norm
Unlike many countries experiencing internal forced migration, displacement in Iraq is not con-
tained within a specific geographic area such as a certain governorate, nor is displacement ex-
perienced by a specific demographic of the Iraqi population. Rather, Iraq has experienced three 
major waves of displacement since the U.S-led coalition invasion in 2003. Though each wave is 
distinct temporally and politically, they overlap significantly in terms of needs.25 The first wave 
of internal displacement took place immediately after the invasion, when between 2003 – 2005, 
500,000 individuals who had been displaced by Saddam’s regime returned to Iraq. This triggered 
the displacement of approximately 200,000 people who had been inhabiting the homes of the 
returning diaspora, or who were otherwise fearful of repercussions. The second wave of dis-
placement was the result of the sectarian conflict that broke out after the 2006 bombing of the 
Al-Askaria shrine in Samarra; a conflict which during its most intense period, resulted in 1,000 
deaths per week.26 This second wave of displacement began to subside during the latter half 
of 2007,27 but in 2014, ISIS strengthened their offensive and occupied swathes of western and 
northern Iraq; notably Anbar, Nineveh and Salah al-Din provinces. The onslaught of ISIS, along 
with the subsequent battle to oust them, resulted in the displacement of a further six million 
people.28 The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that eighty-seven per cent 
of current IDPs originate from the previously ISIS-held territories.29 
This widespread displacement and overlapping of complex, politically significant waves of forced 
migration within and between provinces, is, according to Philip Marfleet, reflective of ‘systematic 
changes brought by invasion and occupation’,30 and is part of what makes the Iraqi displacement 
landscape both unique and challenging to address. Marfleet points to how in the wake of the U.S 
invasion, between 2005 – 2007, with sectarian violence and inter-communal distrust becoming 
increasingly entrenched, militias forced millions out of their homes on the basis that they should 
reside within areas homogenously inhabited by their ethno-religious group.31 Thus, the fractur-
ing of community cohesion began as a result of the 2003 invasion and occupation, but escalated 
as sectarian conflict took hold of the country. By 2011, ‘though minority communities comprised 
five per cent of Iraq’s population, they comprised twenty per cent of those displaced.’32  
With 1.8 million people still displaced throughout Iraq, and over half of these having been dis-
placed for more than three years,33 OCHA has declared that ‘protection remains the overarching 
humanitarian priority in Iraq in 2019.’34 It cites the most pressing protection concerns for 2019 
as: ‘retaliation against people with perceived affiliations to extremist groups; forced, premature, 
uninformed and obstructed returns; lack of civil documentation; severe movement restrictions 
25  Van der Auweraert P, (2011), ‘Displacement and National Institutions: Reflections on the Iraqi Experience’, Middle East Institute and 
Fondation pour le Recherche Strategique, p6.
26  Ali Z, (2018), Women and Gender in Iraq: Between Nation-Building and Fragmentation, p24 & 136.
27  Ibid.
28  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (February 2019), Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan: January 
– December 2019, p6.
29  Riordan N, (2016), ‘Internal Displacement in Iraq: Internally Displaced Persons and Disputed Territory’, New England Journal of Public 
Policy, 28 (2), Article 10, p7.
30  Marfleet P, (2011), ‘Displacement and Denial: Internally Displaced Persons in Today’s Iraq’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi 
Studies, 5 (2), p280.
31  Ibid.
32  Ibid, p286.
33  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, (November 2018), Humanitarian Needs Overview: Iraq, p7.
34  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (February 2019), Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan: January 
– December 2019, p7. 
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in camps; arbitrary detention; IDPs and returnees who require specialized psycho-social support; 
extensive explosive hazard contamination; and housing land and property issues.’35 
Protracted displacement is a particularly widespread, problematic feature within the Iraqi dis-
placement landscape, with long-term IDPs now comprising the majority of the current displaced 
population.36 The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) defines protracted displace-
ment as existing where ‘the process for finding a durable solution for the displaced as stalled, 
and/or where the displaced are marginalized as a consequence of violations or a lack of protec-
tion of their human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights.’37 Durable solutions on 
the other hand, are described by the Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) as being achieved 
‘when internally displaced persons no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs 
that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on 
account of their displacement.’38
Protracted displacement renders IDPs extremely vulnerable, but also, in the absence of inte-
grative durable solutions, often entirely dependent on state and humanitarian aid. This forced 
dependence, as well as being unsustainable, leads to dire consequences for the mental health of 
IDPs.39 Moreover, as displacement lingers on, and humanitarian organizations suffer the funding 
consequences of donor fatigue, protection gaps increasingly arise. UNICEF reports that 232 IDP 
children suffered grave abuses of their human rights between early 2018 and early 2019,40  and 
‘it is estimated that twenty-four per cent of IDP families are using emergency negative coping 
mechanisms to address their basic needs, including children dropping out of school to work, 
criminal acts, child marriage and forced marriage.’41  Additionally, ‘at least 155,000 IDPs living 
in critical shelters remain severely underserved’ with camps that were designed as temporary 
measures having been providing shelter for several years now. The inadequate winterization of 
camps was demonstrated in the winter of 2018, when during torrential rain, several camps in 
Nineveh were flooded, resulting in 7,000 IDPs being evacuated to higher ground.42  
4.2 Protection needs unique to Iraq
Whilst the general protection needs of the Iraqi IDP population may also be experienced by a 
large number of IDP communities across a wide range of countries, there are two specific groups 
of Iraqi IDPs who have protection needs relatively unique to the Iraqi context: perceived ISIS-af-
filiates and minorities.43 These two categories of IDPs will be focused upon due to the combina-
tion of their increased vulnerability and the challenging nature of their protection needs. If Iraq 
is able to formulate a comprehensive protection framework that meets the needs of these two 
categories of IDPs alongside the more general protection needs of the broader IDP population, 
and the socio-economic vulnerabilities of host communities, it will set an extremely positive 
precedent in the field of IDP protection that accounts for a multitude of contemporary conflict 
35  Ibid.
36  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (November 2018), ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 
2019’, p16.             
37  Cited in Norwegian Refugee Council & Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (NRC/IDMC), (December 2013), ‘Internal Displace-
ment in Iraq: Barriers to Integration’, NRC / IDMC joint published with International Organization on Migration (IOM), p32.
38  IASC Framework on Durable Solutions for Internally Displaced Persons, “Quick Reference Guide”: https://www.unhcr.org/50f94cd49.
pdf
39  Nouri B, (9th April 2019), ‘After Years of Conflict, Iraq Grapples with a Mental Health Crisis’, The Wire online and United Nations Office for 
the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (November 2018), ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 2019’, p22.
40 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), (April 2019), ‘UNICEF Report: Humanitarian Action for Children, Iraq’, 
p1.        
41  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (November 2018), ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 
2019’, p4.                
42  Magid P, (25th February 2019), ‘As Displacement Runs to Years, Northern Iraq Camps Need an Overhaul’, The New Humanitarian.                             
43  Minorities, though always in need of protection, possess unique protection needs within the structural, social and political landscape 
of Iraq. 
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dynamics. 
4.3 Perceived ISIS-affiliates
Though terrorist groups, insurgent groups and militias exist across the world, often controlling 
pockets of territory, few, if any, rival ISIS in terms of the relative size of the territory captured and 
administered compared to that of the state, nor the extent of the terror they inflict upon the 
local population. Thousands of minorities and Shia Muslims were brutally murdered and tortured 
by ISIS, who also kidnapped and enslaved minority women, forcibly conscripted children as com-
batants and imposed a radical extremist version of Islam upon the areas they occupied.44 They 
completely corroded the social fabric of the areas they administered, and destroyed homes, in-
frastructure and livelihoods. The trauma inflicted by ISIS will be present for generations. Though 
now ousted from the Iraqi territory they once controlled, and significantly weakened, small cells 
of ISIS remain throughout the Nineveh Plains, Anbar and Salah al-Din,45 contributing to an on-
going atmosphere of fear and distrust among IDPs; particularly between minority ethnic and 
religious groups and Sunni Muslims originating from former ISIS strongholds.46 It is against this 
context of trauma and fear that the protection needs of IDPs who are perceived as ISIS-affiliates 
should be examined, though this is not to detract from the significant protection needs, particu-
larly psycho-social needs experienced by victims of ISIS, which are well documented elsewhere.
The 2019 needs assessment produced by OCHA describes perceived ISIS-affiliates as ‘the most 
vulnerable beneficiaries that humanitarians serve’47 due to the fact that they are at increased risk 
of harassment and arbitrary detention by security forces, they may face ‘grave consequences’ at 
the hands of both security forces and civilians, they ‘are often subject to discriminatory practices 
in the provision of, and access to humanitarian assistance’, and finally, ‘within camps, they can be 
isolated and segregated, subjected to movement restrictions, denied access to humanitarian aid 
and victimized by sexual violence and exploitation.’48 Women and girls with perceived ISIS-affilia-
tion are at extreme risk of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV): OCHA notes that they ‘have 
often been subject to sexual violence, exploitation and abuse by security actors’ within camp 
settings.49 Meanwhile, the stigma attached to perceived ISIS-affiliates increases their marginaliza-
tion, sometimes culminating in expulsion from the community. This, in turn, can lead to affected 
individuals engaging in negative coping mechanisms, such as survival sex, and is a grave protec-
tion concern for both women and children with perceived ISIS-affiliation.50 
The prism of securitization through which Sunni Muslim IDPs from former ISIS-held areas are 
currently viewed by both the GoI and KRG presents significant protection concerns. Whilst some 
perceived, or proven, ISIS-affiliates from within the IDP population are detained under Article 4 
of Iraq’s Anti-Terrorism Law (2005),51 many are arbitrarily detained without charge and ‘held for 
months at a time, without trial or access to justice.’52 Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights illustrates 
how perceived ISIS-affiliates are at great risk of torture whilst detained, stating that IDPs in deten-
tion ‘report experiencing or witnessing: electric shock; being hung by arms or feet and beaten; 
44  Higel L, (2016), ‘Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Security and Protection’, Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group Interna-
tional, p15.
45  Ali S, (7th July 2019), Iraqi forces launch new anti-ISIS operation in ‘desert triangle’ with support of coalition aircraft, Kurdistan 24 online.   
46  Ibid, p11.
47  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (November 2018), ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 
2019’, p22.                
48  Ibid.
49  Ibid, p30.
50  Ibid.
51  See: http://www.vertic.org/media/National%20Legislation/Iraq/IQ_Anti-Terrorism_Law.pdf 
52  Higel L, (2016), ‘Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Security and Protection’, Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group Interna-
tional, p20.
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showered with boiling water; and deprived of meals.’53 These reports correlate with the well-pub-
licised international outcry over use of torture by KRG security forces against children who are 
perceived as ISIS-affiliates in order to coerce confessions.54 Alarmingly, due to institutional short-
comings, there is also the potential for detained IDPs to fall through administrative gaps in the 
prison system and become either accidentally or intentionally disappeared. 55 Furthermore, state 
reluctance to issue or re-issue identification documents to perceived ISIS-affiliates56 exacerbates 
this protection gap immeasurably, whilst simultaneously furthering marginalization and increas-
ing the risk of radicalization. 
In response to abuses of the human rights of perceived ISIS-affiliates among the IDP population, 
OCHA notes that ‘the humanitarian community has advocated consistently against: denial of 
humanitarian assistance; collective punishment; acts of violence; arbitrary detention and arrests; 
harassment and threats against legal aid actors; freedom of movement restrictions; and discrim-
inatory rules and segregation.’57 Non-discriminatory protection is crucial during displacement, 
yet despite concerted, coordinated advocacy on the part of humanitarian actors across Iraq, 
violations continue to occur, particularly violations associated with maintenance of the civilian 
character of camps. Between January – June 2019, 143 incidents of this nature were reported in 
refugee and IDP camps, resulting in 173 violations. ‘The highest increase in the type of incidents 
was with respect to the presence of armed military / security actors in camps.’58 Such violations 
against the civilian character of camps by security forces have largely been driven by concern on 
the part of GoI officials that ‘[ISIS] fighters [are possibly] infiltrating communities of IDPs.’59 
The securitization of Sunni male IDPs has had serious ramifications upon freedom of movement 
for IDPs, including their ability to gain access to safety, particularly outside of camps. Since ISIS 
entered Iraq and made territorial gains in 2014, there have been numerous incidences of restric-
tions of movement perpetrated by both the GoI and KRG, which have endangered the safety of 
IDPs.60 Compounding the issue of restricted movement of certain IDPs is the fact that ‘many re-
turnees who are alleged to be affiliated with [ISIS] have been forcibly evicted from their homes’,61 
resulting in secondary displacement.
More recently, at the end of August 2019, Nineveh governorate authorities began returning IDPs 
who do not originate from the governorate to camps in Anbar, Kirkuk and Salah al-Din gover-
norates. Approximately 1,600 IDPs have been affected by these forced returns. Exacerbating the 
negative impact of this forced removal from IDP camps, is the fact that despite the IDPs in ques-
tion having been subjected to security screening before removal, Anbar governorate authorities 
have refused entry into camps to many of these IDPs, while others have been prevented from re-
turning home. Worryingly, several IDP families returned to Kirkuk and Salah al-Din Governorates 
‘received death threats from community members’, due to the perception that they are affiliated 
53  Ibid.
54  Human Rights Watch, (8th January 2019), Kurdistan Region of Iraq: Detained Children Tortured, Human Rights watch online.                                                                    
55  Higel L, (2016), ‘Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Security and Protection’, Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group Interna-
tional, p20.
56  Van der Wolff A, (5th May 2019), ‘The Denial of Identity Cards to Islamic State Affiliates: A Recipe for Renewed Radicalization?’, Middle 
East Research Institute (MERI) Policy Brief, 4 (31).                                                                                                                                                     
57  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (February 2019), Iraq Humanitarian Response Plan: January 
– December 2019, p20.
58  Protection Cluster: Iraq and Camp Coordination and Camp Management Cluster: Iraq, (August 2019), ‘Civilian Character of Camps 
Incident Tracking Matrix’, Quarter Two 2019 – Quarterly Report. (Internal report, but used and information from within published with permission 
of the Iraq Protection Cluster Coordinator). 
59  United Nations General Assembly, (5th April 2016), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons on his Mission to Iraq’, A/HRC/32/35/Add.1, Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Agenda Item 3, p12.
60  Ibid.
61  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (November 2018), ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 
2019’, p31.                 
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with ISIS.62
This securitization of IDPs prompted the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs to 
recommend in 2016 that ‘while legitimate security concerns require responses, these must be 
temporary, have a legal basis and be non-discriminatory both in international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law.’63 As the above-described protection concerns demonstrate, 
security responses to IDPs who are perceived ISIS-affiliates are far from temporary or indiscrim-
inatory, and they certainly contravene international human rights and humanitarian standards 
prohibiting arbitrary detention, detention without trial, torture, and restrictions on freedom of 
movement amongst other protections.
4.4 Minorities and the Disputed Territories
Minority IDPs in Iraq face a complex variety of protection needs depending on where they 
originate from, the cause of their displacement, what discriminatory practices and / or abuses 
they have been (or continue to be) subjected to at the hands of any combination of ISIS / state 
forces / militias / civilians, and how their particular social group is perceived by majority society. 
Many minority IDPs originate from the Disputed Territories which sit between recognised GoI 
and KRG-administered governorates, crossing the north of the country from East to West. ‘The 
Disputed Territories are historically one of the most ethnically, culturally, and religiously diverse 
regions of Iraq, and for centuries have been inhabited by Turkmen, Assyrian and Chaldean Chris-
tians, Yazidis, Shabak and other minorities as well as Kurds and Arabs.’64 Both Salah al-Din and 
Nineveh provinces, which were formerly occupied in whole, or in part, by ISIS are situated within 
these territories.
The distinct causes of displacement experienced by many minorities, who fled unprecedented 
mass brutality at the hands of ISIS, have led to a significant proportion of the minority IDP pop-
ulation being in dire need of comprehensive, long-term psychological assistance. Perhaps the 
most internationally recognised minority community who suffered horribly under ISIS, are the 
Yezidi, of whom almost 10,000 were killed or captured within just a few days in 2014.65 ‘Many 
Yezidis are struggling to deal with the psychological aftermath of what a UN commission has 
deemed [to be] genocide’,66 with suicide rates among the community rising sharply. ‘Among the 
most profoundly traumatized are those who survived ISIS enslavement, many of whom have still 
not [returned]’67 to their homes. 
Whilst many minority IDPs may remain too fearful to return home, the option of voluntary return 
(with assistance and support) should always be available in accordance with Principle 28 of the 
GPs, which states that ‘authorities have the primary duty and responsibility to establish condi-
tions…which allow [IDPs] to return voluntarily, in safety and in dignity, to their homes or places 
of habitual residence.’ However, the current socio-political landscape of Iraq poses numerous 
obstacles to return being successfully implemented as a durable solution, especially if those 
returnees originate from the Disputed Territories. These territories are resource-rich, containing 
large oil reserves, and as such, have been the site of armed conflict for political and territorial 
control between the Arab and Kurd authorities and their proxy militias for decades. This struggle 
has often played out in such a way as to have a disproportionately negative effect on the minori-
62  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (August 2019), Humanitarian Bulletin Iraq, p1-2.                                         
63   United Nations General Assembly, (5th April 2016), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons on his Mission to Iraq’, A/HRC/32/35/Add.1, Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Agenda Item 3, p21.
64  Human Rights Watch, (2009), ‘On Vulnerable Ground: Violence Against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territo-
ries’, p5.
65  Dearden L, (9th May 2017), Almost 10,000 Yazidis ‘killed or kidnapped in ISIS genocide, but true scale of horror may never be known’, 
The Independent online.
66  Westcott T, (29th July 2019), ‘Uptick in Suicides Signals Deepening Mental Health Crisis for Yazidis’, The New Humanitarian online.                                      
67  Ibid.
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ties who live within the territories.
In discussing how policies relating to the Disputed Territories influence and affect stabilization 
and solutions to displacement, Nancy Riordan describes how ‘the IDP crisis we are witnessing has 
a cumulative aspect that includes: the unresolved historical displacement of Iraq’s Kurds, Turk-
men and other minorities through successive measures by the Iraqi government under Saddam 
Hussein to “Arabize” the oil-rich northern territories; attempts by Kurdish authorities since 2005 
to reshape the demographic balance in their favour, especially in Nineveh and Kirkuk; displace-
ment during the years of U.S-led occupation; and the battle against [ISIS] which [triggered]…the 
largest wave of displacement in the country’s history.’68 Writing in 2008, Elizabeth Ferris suggest-
ed that ‘displacement [from and within the Disputed Territories] is not just an accidental by-prod-
uct of the [Iraqi] conflict, but is both an objective and a strategy in the military struggle – a way 
of consolidating territorial and political control.’69 This suggestion is supported by a 2009 Human 
Rights Watch report documenting violence against minority communities in Nineveh,70 which 
provides a great deal of insight into the circumstances and lived experiences of minorities within 
the Disputed Territories. The report illustrates that minorities in Nineveh are vulnerable to forced 
expulsion and physical coercion by both the Arab and Kurdish authorities as they each try to 
alter the demographics of the territories in their favour.
The political history of the Disputed Territories is multi-layered and extremely complex, being 
subjected to constant power-plays and changes of administration. As mentioned above, under 
Saddam’s regime, a policy of Arabization was pursued by the state which sought to remove any 
non-Arab minorities from the region. After the U.S-led invasion however, with the tacit support 
of the U.S, the KRG incorporated the Disputed Territories into their own regional administration. 
More recently, in late 2017, as ISIS was being ousted from Mosul and the Nineveh Plains, Iraqi 
state forces, the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) and other allied militias reclaimed the Dis-
puted Territories, placing them once again, under GoI control. In the latest turn of the political 
roundabout, Kurdish parliamentarians are currently alleging that a policy of Arabization of the 
territories is once again being pursued by the GoI.71 However, for members of the KRG to express 
concern that Arabization will be detrimental for the rights of minorities would be disingenuous 
given its own post-invasion behaviour towards minorities in the territories. Human Rights Watch 
points to how minorities in the Disputed Territories ‘bear…the brunt of the conflict…coming 
under intense pressure to declare their loyalty to one side or the other or face the consequences.’ 
The group elaborates upon these consequences by detailing how minorities ‘have been victim-
ized by Kurdish authorities’ heavy-handed tactics, including arbitrary arrests and detentions, and 
intimidation, directed at anyone resistant to Kurdish expansionist plans.’72 In an attempt to coerce 
minorities into identifying as Kurdish, or supporting the KRG as administrative authority in the 
territories, ‘Kurdish forces have mostly relied on intimidation, threats, arbitrary arrests and deten-
tions’, but there have also been documented cases of torture.73 
It is within this context of desperation, distrust and coercion which currently characterizes the 
Disputed Territories, that acts of ‘retaliation and revenge’74 against perceived ISIS-affiliates are 
being committed. The GoI and KRG’s persistent emphasis on return as the most desirable solu-
68  Riordan N, (2016), ‘Internal Displacement in Iraq: Internally Displaced Persons and Disputed Territory’, New England Journal of Public 
Policy, 28 (2), Article 10, p1-2.
69  Cited in ibid, p2.
70  Human Rights Watch, (2009), ‘On Vulnerable Ground: Violence Against Minority Communities in Nineveh Province’s Disputed Territo-
ries’.
71  Shilani H, (4th July 2019), ‘Kurdistan Parliament Investigates ‘Arabization’ in Iraq’s Disputed Territories’, Kurdistan 24 online.                                  
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tion, despite lack of support provided to returnees, is directly contributing towards increased 
inter-communal tensions, increased vulnerability of IDPs and returnees as well as secondary 
displacement. It is predominantly in the Disputed Territories that returnees have been forcibly 
evicted from their homes, prevented from returning, or forcibly returned by various GoI or KRG-
aligned factions seeking to consolidate their control of the region.75 
4.5 Iraqi state response to displacement to date
The GoI has long struggled to adequately address the needs of the huge number of internally 
displaced within the state. Peter Van der Auweraert states that ‘structural weaknesses affect all 
aspects of government institutions including the physical infrastructure, the staffing and the 
overall bureaucratic culture that civil servants need to work under.’76 Deliberate mismanagement 
by the Baath regime under Saddam, post-invasion looting, corruption and an element of con-
flict-driven “brain drain” all contribute towards these structural inefficiencies. Meanwhile, institu-
tional corruption is an insidious problem77 which consistently serves to obstruct effective imple-
mentation of anti-discriminatory IDP protection and securement of durable solutions.
Despite entrenched corruption and ‘continuing lack of institutional capacity’,78 a functioning 
Ministry of Displacement and Migration (MoDM) was established in 2003 and given the mandate 
of dealing with ‘all matters pertaining to Iraqi refugees and displaced persons, including, but not 
limited to, matters associated with their repatriation, relocation, resettlement and reintegration.’79 
The MoDM serves as a focal point for organizations working with refugees and IDPs in Iraq, and 
is responsible for planning and implementing durable solutions. However, despite there being 
three internationally recognised durable solutions outlined under the 2010 IASC Framework on 
Durable Solutions for IDPs,80 the MoDM and international stakeholders have consistently pushed 
exclusively for return.
Nadia Siddiqui points to how this emphasis on return is framed as ‘the key to success in the 
aftermath of the conflict with ISIS’, despite the fact that it neglects the reality of successful, sus-
tainable return: it is a process that can take years.81 Furthermore, Siddiqui explains how focusing 
exclusively on return can obfuscate implementation of human rights-based durable solutions, 
given the fact that for some, return is impossible (for example, approximately 2,522 square kilo-
metres of land previously held by ISIS is littered with mines and unexploded ordinance),82 whilst 
for others, their pre-displacement circumstances may have been characterized by a lack of rights, 
and therefore, in situations such as these, return is the least desirable durable solution.83 An ex-
ample of the failed return-focused policy is the 2018 state-assisted return to Mosul of IDPs from 
Harsham and Baharka camps in Erbil. The ensuing lack of livelihood and reintegration assistance, 
along with lack of provision of services in Mosul, proved to make long-term return untenable, 
75  Riordan N, (2016), ‘Internal Displacement in Iraq: Internally Displaced Persons and Disputed Territory’, New England Journal of Public 
Policy, 28 (2), Article 10, p8.
76  Van der Auweraert P, (2011), ‘Displacement and National Institutions: Reflections on the Iraqi Experience’, Middle East Institute and 
Fondation pour le Recherche Strategique, p9.
77  Marfleet P, (2011), ‘Displacement and Denial: Internally Displaced Persons in Today’s Iraq’, International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi 
Studies, 5 (2), p288.
78  Observation noted by the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, cited in ibid.
79  The MoDM was established by Coalition Provincial Authority Order 50. See Van der Auweraert P, (2011), ‘Displacement and National 
Institutions: Reflections on the Iraqi Experience’, Middle East Institute and Fondation pour le Recherche Strategique, p14.
80  https://www.unhcr.org/50f94cd49.pdf
81  Siddiqui N, (2018), ‘Balancing the Rights of Displaced, Returning and Remaining Populations: Learning from Iraq’, Forced Migration 
Review, 53, p64.
82  United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), (November 2018), ‘Iraq: Humanitarian Needs Overview 
2019’, p30.                
83  Siddiqui N, (2018), ‘Balancing the Rights of Displaced, Returning and Remaining Populations: Learning from Iraq’, Forced Migration 
Review, 53, p64.
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therefore the returnees migrated back to the camps they had initially left in Erbil.84 
Given the combination of socio-economic diversity that characterizes different governorates of 
Iraq, differing regional causes and consequences of displacement, disparity between numbers of 
IDPs present across different governorates, and the differing needs of host communities across 
the country, centralized governance makes effective response to displacement challenging. This 
is particularly so when considering that successful return-based and integrative approaches to 
durable solutions will require socio-economically and psycho-socially distinct sets of needs to 
be adequately addressed for both IDPs and host communities across different governorates. 
Additionally, in some instances, particularly within the Disputed Territories, central government 
authorities may be perceived as acting in a discriminatory fashion towards non-Arab IDPs and 
host communities in terms of the assistance provided which will only serve to ignite or perpetu-
ate tensions between social groups. 
84  Robinson A.C, (6th May 2018), ‘Iraq’s IDPs: If they don’t visit the camps, how dare they ask us to vote?’, Rudaw online.                       
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5. Iraq’s 2008 National Policy on Displacement – A Missed 
Opportunity
Iraq’s 2008 NPD is notable for two reasons. First, as mentioned during the introduction, it is one 
of only two national displacement policies in the Middle East.85 This is a considerable achieve-
ment given the aforementioned lack of capacity which characterizes Iraqi governmental insti-
tutions, combined with the fact that there is no regional legal instrument on the protection of 
IDPs specific to the Middle East or Arab countries. Though there is a regional human rights treaty; 
the 1994 Arab Charter on Human Rights,86 which Iraq ratified in 2013, human rights should be 
viewed as complimentary in contexts of displacement due to the fact that they are often too 
general to adequately address specific displacement-oriented needs and contexts. 
The second reason for which Iraq’s NPD should be applauded is that it is one of only thirty laws 
and policies worldwide to explicitly mention the GPs. Furthermore, it is one of only nineteen to 
explicitly endorse the IDP definition contained within the GPs.87 In this sense, the NPD is ex-
tremely progressive in terms of content, as in the absence of an international binding treaty on 
the rights of the internally displaced, the GPs are the most comprehensive international instru-
ment operating to improve the protection of IDPs. However, whilst the NPD is progressive in 
terms of content, and in 2008 had the potential to set a very positive precedent in terms of IDP 
protection, it was never passed into domestic legislation, nor was it implemented in practice, 
with the MoDM failing to disseminate it to relevant line Ministries, or deliver targeted training to 
relevant Ministry staff.88 
Since 2008, and specifically in the post-ISIS era, the displacement landscape within Iraq has 
evolved and complicated considerably. This paper will evaluate the contents of the NPD against 
the contemporary displacement context in Iraq in order to evaluate whether it would provide 
sufficient protection if passed into law as it is, or whether, if necessary, it could feasibly be devel-
oped into a robust protection mechanism that could address the protection concerns unique 
to Iraq. Due to the fact that the NPD is built upon the foundation of the GPs, the GPs will be 
examined in relation to the current Iraqi displacement context first, followed by the NPD. This 
approach will allow identification of shortcomings in both instruments in order to illustrate why 
the GPs should not necessarily represent a ceiling in IDP protection. 
5.1 The Guiding Principles in the Iraqi displacement context
The GPs are relatively unique in terms of international protection instruments since they consti-
tute “soft law” and are therefore non-binding as a stand-alone instrument. Though containing 
protection provisions which are binding at their source, or within customary international law, 
the GPs can arguably be viewed as representing a set of aspirational standards. One such exam-
ple of their aspirational nature is the definition of an IDP contained within, which encompasses 
individuals fleeing ‘the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of 
human rights’ as well as ‘natural or human-made disasters.’89 As Menaka Lecamwasam points out, 
‘the description of IDPs stated in the [GPs] is not a legal definition, but only a ‘descriptive iden-
tification of the category of persons whose needs are the concern of the GPs.’’90 Therefore, this 
broad definition is extremely beneficial in terms of inclusive IDP protection only when incorpo-
85  Nicolau I & Pagot A, (2018), ‘Laws and Policies on Internal Displacement: Global Adoption and Gaps’, Forced Migration Review, 59, p9.
86  https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b38540.html
87  Orchard P, (2018), ‘Implementing the Guiding Principles at the Domestic Level’, Forced Migration Review, 59, p10.
88  United Nations General Assembly, (5th April 2016), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons on his Mission to Iraq’, A/HRC/32/35/Add.1, Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Agenda Item 3, p5.
89  The 2004 Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, ‘Introduction: Scope and Purpose’, 2. 
90  Kalin W, (2008), p9 cited in Lecamwasam M, (2014), ‘The Internally Displaced in South Asia: Lessons from Kampala’, Asia-Pacific Journal 
on Human Rights and the Law, 15 (1&2), p151.
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rated, in full, within domestic, regional or international binding legislation. 
The drafting process for the GPs has, according to some scholars, been key to their success and 
Roberta Cohen argues that three distinct features of this process are integral. First, she points to 
the grounding of the GPs in all three branches of law pertaining to the protection of IDPs: human 
rights, humanitarian and refugee law, therefore ensuring the applicability of the GPs ‘to most 
situations of internal displacement.’91 Secondly, she asserts that the drafters of the GPs employed 
a needs-based approach, examining existing law applicable to IDPs as a means through to which 
identify protection gaps. Thirdly, she identifies that though the GPs contain protection provi-
sions for IDPs, they do not privilege IDPs over other vulnerable, non-displaced groups.92 Though 
Cohen’s implied confidence that protection gaps have been filled by the GPs is being overly 
optimistic, particularly within the Iraqi context, and specifically with regard to perceived ISIS-af-
filiates, the third factor is crucial for the success of securing durable solutions to displacement.
With reference to Cohen’s second point concerning identification of protection gaps, the GPs do 
indeed contain many essential provisions for protection of IDPs without prejudice. Importantly, 
Principle 1 confers upon IDPs the same rights and freedoms as other citizens, whilst Principle 4 
articulates their right to freedom from discrimination. In Iraq, these provisions are particularly 
useful for offering security and protection to minorities, especially within the Disputed Terri-
tories. The GPs can arguably be recognised as protecting minorities in general terms, but they 
have yet to accommodate the distinct protection needs of perceived ISIS-affiliates. For example, 
Principle 10 protects IDPs from ‘enforced disappearances, including abduction or unacknowl-
edged detention, threatening or resulting in death’, but stops short of prohibiting arbitrary (yet 
acknowledged) detention or indefinite detention. Within the context of a sectarian, post-conflict 
environment recovering from terrorism, and specifically the brutality of ISIS, this is a significant 
shortcoming, as in such an environment arrests can be driven by political ambition and framed 
within the discourse of securitization to give an air of legitimacy,  thus disguising the abuse of 
extremely vulnerable IDPs. 
The Iraqi displacement landscape is a challenging arena in which to formulate and implement 
workable durable solutions, with the situation in the Disputed Territories demonstrating the 
absolute need for protection from forced return, prohibited return, forced secondary displace-
ment and forced resettlement. Emphasis on the voluntary nature of any durable solution frame-
works will be crucial for longevity and integration. Principle 28 of the GPs is maybe the most 
enlightened feature of the entire instrument, as it breaks the protection mould in order to pro-
vide for not only the voluntary nature of solutions to displacement, but also the responsibility of 
state authorities to ‘endeavor to facilitate the reintegration of returned or resettled IDPs.’ It also 
requires ‘full participation of [IDPs] in the planning and management of their return or resettle-
ment and integration.’ This stands in opposition to the GoI and KRG’s current emphasis on return 
above all else, with return also often being implemented in an unsupported, myopic manner. 
An important note to make when evaluating the GPs is that whilst they do offer significant pro-
tection, they do not sufficiently address protection gaps rendered by contemporary post-con-
flict societies, particularly those where terrorist groups or other, irregular militias, have played 
an important role in conflict dynamics. Moreover, though they are forward-thinking in terms of 
advocating for reconciliation initiatives and participatory approaches to planning, in most situa-
tions, they nevertheless come into effect only after displacement has taken place. Principle 6, for 
example, protects individuals from being ‘arbitrarily displaced from his or her home or place of 
habitual residence’, but the examples provided under this principle are predominantly applicable 
91  Cohen R, (2014), ‘Lessons from the Development of the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement’, Forced Migration Review, 46, p13.
92  Ibid.
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only to state authorities. Whilst technically preventative, Principle 6 is very limited in its scope 
and vision, stopping short of taking a more holistic approach to prevention of displacement 
which would also incorporate non-state actors and civilians. Furthermore, with no immediately 
accessible mechanisms for enforcement available, if provisions within the GPs prove to be too 
inconvenient, states can circumnavigate several of them without repercussion, as demonstrat-
ed by both the GoI and KRG in relation to perceived ISIS-affiliates and attempts to manipulate 
demographics in the Disputed Territories. 
5.2 The 2008 Iraq National Policy on Displacement: An overview
Iraq’s NPD suffers from a significant disjuncture between the written provisions contained within 
the policy, and the physical implementation (or, more precisely, failed implementation) of those 
provisions. The policy references the GPs throughout, whilst also outlining the rights of IDPs ap-
plicable under Iraq’s 2005 national Constitution. Additionally, the policy draws upon the Sphere 
Standards93 in order to outline the basic needs of IDPs to be met in order to comply with interna-
tional humanitarian best practice. In a less complex displacement landscape, and with adequate 
funding, the 2008 NPD might prove to be a robust policy. However, there are several contextual 
short falls which sit alongside positive aspects of the policy, which will now be examined.
Conforming to the standard set by the GPs in terms of formulation, the NPD was also created 
through a consultative approach which included the MoDM, the KRG ‘and a large number of 
stakeholders at the local, regional and national levels in Iraq. The consultations also involved the 
groups and communities affected by displacement (both…IDPs and host communities).’94 De-
tails of the consultation process are not included within the policy, but it certainly seems that at 
least some attempt was made to follow the formulative process of the GPs and incorporate the 
views of concerned stakeholders. However, in terms of durable solutions, the host community 
has been entirely overlooked by this policy, as it focuses exclusively on livelihood creation and 
socio-economic assistance for IDPs. 
As it stands, section two of the NPD identifies and details two phases of displacement: that prior 
to 2003, and that post-2003 up until July 2008, when the policy was published. An updated 
version of the policy for 2020 requires a third phase to be added: that of displacement caused by 
ISIS and the subsequent conflict against them. The reason for the need to include ISIS-induced 
displacement as a distinct phase is due to the unprecedented damage the group caused to the 
fabric of society in the territory they occupied, and beyond, resulting in consequential acute 
protection needs for certain groups of IDPs (for example, the Yezidis). These protection-specific 
needs interact with factors contributing to ongoing protracted displacement, with many minori-
ty IDPs being too afraid, or physically unable to return home.95 Moreover, ISIS are the catalyst 
for the existence of the new demographic of IDPs, who OCHA has identified as being the most 
vulnerable in contemporary Iraq: perceived affiliates.96 Failure to include this third, post-2014 
wave of displacement in an updated version of the policy, will severely limit the success of any 
attempts at durable solutions, whilst continuing to neglect the very specific needs of both IDPs 
who are perceived as ISIS-affiliates, and IDPs (and host community members) who are survivors 
of ISIS atrocities. Such a balancing act is unlikely to be achievable through a generalized humani-
tarian response. 
93  Information on the Sphere Standards can be found here: https://spherestandards.org, whilst the 2018 edition of the Sphere Handbook 
can be downloaded here: https://spherestandards.org/handbook/editions/ 
94  2008 National Policy on Displacement, Ministry of Displacement and Migration (Iraq), p3.
95  See Magid P, (25th February 2019), ‘As Displacement Runs to Years, Northern Iraq Camps Need an Overhaul’, The New Humanitarian and 
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The drafters of the NPD seem to take a muddled approach to causes of, and responses to, dis-
placement throughout the policy. For example, section 2.3 states that as a result of displace-
ment, ‘[m]any people lost their jobs and sources of income. Lack of employment opportunities 
has driven some of them into joining terrorists and other illegally armed groups.’97 This statement 
is not worded in such a way as to specifically apply to IDPs, but rather can be interpreted as 
referencing displacement-affected communities in general, which is an important distinction 
for the planning and implementation of durable solutions. As noted by Cohen above, one of 
the reasons behind the successful implementation of the GPs is that they do not differentiate 
between IDPs and other vulnerable individuals. This holistic perspective taken by the NPD looks 
promising when viewed in conjunction with the fact that it describes durable solutions as ‘based 
on three elements – long-term security, restitution of or compensation for lost property and an 
environment that sustains the life of former displaced persons under normal economic and so-
cial conditions.’98 However, the policy then reverts back to a much more traditional, and arguably, 
less sustainable framework for protection which focuses exclusively on IDPs. For example, the 
provisions for employment and livelihood generation contained within Article 7.7 are exclusively 
addressed towards IDPs, simultaneously perpetuating their exclusion from the host community 
and privileging IDP needs over those of socio-economically vulnerable members of the host 
community. Moreover, though the NPD does not explicitly cite return as the desired solution, the 
protection provisions regarding education and shelter are likely financially unsustainable during 
situations of protracted displacement, and in the absence of explicit inclusion of a framework 
through which to pursue local integration or resettlement as options, return is left as the de fac-
to option for increasingly desperate IDPs, without it necessarily being truly voluntary, as required 
by Principle 28 of the GPs.
The current situation within the Disputed Territories raises a number of concerns which need to 
be addressed in an updated version of the NPD in order for IDP protection in Iraq to be effec-
tively conducted in a non-discriminatory manner. Though freedom of movement is well provid-
ed for within the 2008 policy, the policy is neither binding nor implemented. Thus, a proactive 
approach towards IDP protection within the Disputed Territories would be to include an Article 
exclusively dedicated to this region of Iraq, in which a framework for protection and security 
cooperation between the GoI and KRG is outlined, including details of shared responsibilities, 
as well as clearly formulated avenues for communication. This framework, in conjunction with 
adherence to it, should be overseen by a committee of local and international stakeholders who 
are given full authority to monitor and report on the behaviour of both parties.
A further protection omission related to the principle of non-discrimination, which has severe 
implications for a number of IDPs, both inside the Disputed Territories and elsewhere in Iraq and 
Iraqi Kurdistan, is the current failure to apply the principle of non-discrimination in protection 
and provision of humanitarian assistance to perceived ISIS-affiliates. Article 6.2 of the NPD refer-
ences Article 14 of the Iraqi Constitution, which ‘stipulates the principle of non-discrimination re-
gardless of sex, race, origin, colour, religion, faith, sect, belief, opinion or socio-economic status.’99 
The recognised grounds for discrimination are comprehensive indeed, but for the purposes of 
the NPD, Article 6.2 should be updated to include the provision of protection for those who are 
perceived ISIS or extremist-affiliates, until they are charged and tried in a court of law according 
to due process. For this strand of protection to be successfully implemented, a sensitive, bal-
anced, approach must be taken which protects both perceived ISIS-affiliates as well as those who 
are survivors of ISIS and likely coping with a great deal of trauma. This leads to the final area in 
which the NPD is lacking: dialogue based initiatives for integration, reintegration and reconcilia-
97  2008 National Policy on Displacement, Ministry of Displacement and Migration (Iraq), section 2.3, p5.
98  Ibid, section 4.5, p6.
99  Ibid, p8.
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tion.
The conclusion of the NPD explains that it ‘provides a framework for the rights of displaced Iraqis 
before, during and after displacement as enshrined in the Iraqi Constitution and national and 
international laws…’ It goes on to state that ‘[i]n particular, [the GoI] will give special attention 
to the issue of protecting IDP and returnee women and children as well as other vulnerable 
groups from all types of exploitation and violence.’100 This is a commendable commitment, but 
one that must be applied equally to all IDPs, without discrimination, otherwise it is rendered 
meaningless. Perceived ISIS-affiliates (including men, women and children) must all be offered 
equal protection as minorities and other vulnerable groups of IDPs. Integral to this protection, 
however, is prevention of further violence and conflict during a process of voluntary, support-
ed durable solutions. Within the context of fractured communities divided along ethnic and 
sectarian lines, an updated version of the NPD should prioritize the widescale implementation 
of dialogue-based initiatives to repair relations between different ethnic and religious groups, 
therefore building resilience against future conflict.
5.3 Reasons for the failure of Iraq’s 2008 National Policy on 
Displacement
As has been outlined above, overall Iraq’s 2008 NPD was a progressive instrument for the protec-
tion of IDPs, which incorporated the GPs and referenced both the 2005 National Constitution of 
Iraq and the international humanitarian Sphere Standards. Although adjustments would need to 
be made in order to align an updated, 2020 NPD with the contemporary displacement context 
within Iraq, the NPD remains a potentially useful policy. However, in order to examine whether 
a 2020 version of the NPD would offer adequate protection, it is necessary to first identify the 
reasons for the lack of protection afforded by the 2008 policy, which does not seem to have been 
implemented at all, despite its potential for success.101 
In January 2011, Iraq’s Deputy Minister of Displacement and Migration ‘spoke of a plan to resolve 
the problem of [displacement] within a year, and to create durable conditions for the return 
and reintegration of IDPs and refugees.’102 This plan did not materialize, meaning that when ISIS 
took territory in Anbar and Nineveh in 2014, the forced movement of millions of Iraqis occurred 
amidst a scenario already characterized by protracted displacement. The various reasons for 
the failed implementation of the NPD boil down to lack of capacity and failed coordination. 
During a visit to Iraq in 2016, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of IDPs found ‘it 
was evident that there was little awareness of the [NPD] and its provisions. There was a lack of 
adherence to those provisions by line Ministries and other institutions, rendering their potential 
to assist in guiding government action unfulfilled in practice.’103 The Special Rapporteur went on 
to point out that ‘civil society groups emphasized that the policy existed only on paper, and that 
consequentially, there was an urgent need for a functioning legal and policy framework, as well 
as training and awareness-raising for public officials’ and line Ministries.104
The importance of training government officials on displacement issues is highlighted by Eliza-
beth Ferris et al, who describe it as ‘a key element of the exercise of national responsibility’, and 
one that ‘can contribute to the effectiveness of all aspects of the government’s response.’105 Ferris 
100  Ibid, p17.
101  United Nations General Assembly, (5th April 2016), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons on his Mission to Iraq’, A/HRC/32/35/Add.1, Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Agenda Item 3, p5.
102  Ferris E, Mooney E & Stark C, (2011), ‘From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement’, The 
Brookings Institution – London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, p34.                              
103  United Nations General Assembly, (5th April 2016), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced 
Persons on his Mission to Iraq’, A/HRC/32/35/Add.1, Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Agenda Item 3, p5.
104  Ibid.
105  Ferris E, Mooney E & Stark C, (2011), ‘From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement’, The 
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et al. recognise that Iraq’s NPD represents a high level of government acknowledgement of the 
scale of the displacement crisis in the country, but they draw attention to the fact that effective 
response to displacement requires legislative action, and this is where the 2008 NPD suffers 
the most: it was never passed into domestic law. Without a concerted effort to coordinate with 
relevant line ministries and provide training to relevant government officials and stakeholders, 
a promising policy fell by the wayside. If it had been passed into law at the same time as being 
the subject of a national action plan for awareness raising and implementation, the NPD would 
likely have secured a significant level of protection for the majority of IDPs (excluding perceived 
ISIS-affiliates), though it would still likely have failed to secure truly durable solutions due to its 
emphasis on return, provisions for socio-economic assistance which exclusively target IDPs, and 
lack of concrete framework for reconciliation and integration.
There is of course a final factor upon which successful implementation of any policy will bal-
ance: that of funding. Section 3.4 of the NPD states that the GoI will ‘[a]llocate funds and develop 
relevant financial procedures for the implementation of this policy.’106 In a situation such as Iraq’s 
a great deal of funding (and corresponding political will) will be required from the international 
community. 
Brookings Institution – London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement, p53.
106  2008 National Policy on Displacement, Ministry of Displacement and Migration (Iraq), p5.
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6. Aligning Iraq’s National Policy on Displacement with 
Contemporary Protection Needs
This research has, so far, discussed the contemporary displacement landscape within Iraq in 
terms of the relatively unique challenges it presents for protecting IDPs who are perceived as 
being affiliated with ISIS, as well as minority (and other) IDPs originating from the Disputed 
Territories. The 2008 NPD has also been examined against the context of the contemporary dis-
placement landscape in order to ascertain where protection gaps exist. Three areas of the 2008 
NPD require addressing in order for it to provide sufficient protection to IDPs in Iraq from 2020 
onwards. First, perceived ISIS-affiliates must be explicitly included within the remit of the provi-
sions prohibiting discrimination. Secondly, IDP protection within the Disputed Territories must 
be addressed through a specific framework which outlines roles for both the GoI and KRG in a 
cooperative relationship working towards maintaining security in the territories whilst simulta-
neously ensuring that protection provisions are met. Finally, durable solutions must be secured 
which are both voluntary and either integrative or reintegrative; assisting the vulnerable within 
the broader community and contributing towards community cohesion rather than focusing 
exclusively on IDPs. Moreover, the integrative and reintegrative aspects of such durable solutions 
should include long-term dialogue-based initiatives aiming to rebuild trust between different 
ethnic and religious groups, thereby building community resilience to conflict and ensuring that 
solutions remain sustainable. 
This remainder of this paper will examine those provisions of the 2009 African Union Convention 
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa (the Kampala Con-
vention)107 from which lessons can be learned for a redrafting of the NPD that would optimize 
protection of IDPs, including through prevention of displacement, which both the GPs and Iraq’s 
NPD currently approach in a superficial manner. The Kampala Convention also proves to be 
illuminating with regard to durable solutions, which may well be the result of the fact that it was 
drafted by the African Union rather than Europeans or other “Western” nations, and therefore 
represents, and responds to, the concerns of more community-oriented perspectives and devel-
oping economies.
6.1 The Kampala Convention: a brief overview
The Kampala Convention is widely recognised as the most comprehensive legally binding instru-
ment for the protection of IDPs. As well as being the only instrument to adopt the description 
of IDPs provided by the GPs, thereby making it a legally binding definition, it contains four main 
characteristics and provisions which distinguish it from other IDP-related instruments.
First, the Kampala Convention differs markedly from other, often UN-drafted human rights 
instruments, in that great importance is placed on collective, socio-economic and cultural (ESC) 
rights, reflecting the priorities of many African countries, but also ‘a growing recognition of the 
intimate relationship between the protection of ESC rights and rates of displacement…[which] 
has resulted in an understanding that unfulfilled basic needs constitute the deepest cause of 
conflict.’108 In contrast to the Kampala Convention, Lauren Groth points out that ‘[a]lthough ESC 
rights are conveyed in the GPs…they do not explicitly confer protection for the broad range 
of ESC rights as a whole.’109 In a country such as Iraq, with high rates of unemployment, strong 
communal bonds and social reverence for culture and tradition, adoption of provisions that 
107  https://www.refworld.org/docid/4ae572d82.html
108  Agbakwa S C, (2002) p178 cited in Groth L, (2011), ‘Engendering Protection: An Analysis of the 2009 Kampala Convention and its Provi-
sions for Internally Displaced Women’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 23, p238-239.
109  Groth L, (2011), ‘Engendering Protection: An Analysis of the 2009 Kampala Convention and its Provisions for Internally Displaced Wom-
en’, International Journal of Refugee Law, 23, p240-241.
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safeguard ESC rights would prove to be extremely beneficial for IDPs and wider society – particu-
larly within the Disputed Territories where certain groups may be coerced into assimilation. Thus, 
protection of ESC rights could prove to be crucial for development of a plan through which to 
achieve durable solutions, whilst concurrently establishing and maintaining a higher standard of 
IDP protection than that provided by the GPs.
The broad, collective approach to human rights taken by the Kampala Convention, likely stems 
from the drafting process, which in line with the GPs was conducted in a consultative manner.  
This is the second characteristic which likely contributes to its uniqueness in the field of IDP pro-
tection. The Kampala drafting process went beyond that recommended within the GPs, empha-
sizing ‘the principles of participation, inclusiveness, partnership and ownership.’110 This approach 
led to the inclusion of government officials, thematic experts, civil society organizations, human 
rights and humanitarian NGOs, trade unions, women’s and youth groups in the drafting pro-
cess.111 Prisca Kamungi points to how this broad participatory base including grassroots groups 
‘provided useful criticism and expertise that helped capture disparate causes of displacement 
and contextual challenges to effective response,’112 ultimately contributing to a robust frame-
work for durable solutions.
A third factor contributing to the widely recognised success of the Kampala Convention is the 
fact that a great deal of attention is paid to armed non-state actors (ANSAs)113 and multination-
al corporations (including private military and security corporations),114 their responsibilities in 
situations of armed conflict (and prevention of displacement) as well as identification of acts that 
they will be held criminally responsible for. This provides a broader protection provision than 
those detailed within the NPD, which focus exclusively on the role of state actors as enshrined 
within national legislation.
Finally, the Kampala Convention takes an extremely broad-based, holistic approach to dura-
ble solutions, which seeks to eradicate the root causes of displacement, whilst simultaneously 
recognising that restitution is not simply limited to housing, land and property issues, but also 
physical, mental and other types of harm.115 Thus, the Kampala Convention takes a contextually 
relevant approach to addressing displacement in the short, medium and long terms, founded 
upon a rounded sense of human need. 
6.2 Prevention of Displacement: Lessons from Kampala
According to comparative research conducted by Ferris et al,116 ‘prevention [of displacement] is 
paramount, but is probably the most difficult measure to take and the least likely to be taken’ 
in all countries.117 One reason for this, they argue, is that government response to displacement 
is heavily influenced by politics, resulting in a near unanimous global preference for return as a 
durable solution, to the exclusion of local integration and resettlement. Ferris et al. point out that 
‘preventing displacement during conflict requires a high-level commitment by national author-
ities and the engagement of security forces.’118 Framed in this way, and viewed against the con-
110  Kamungi P, (2010), ‘Beyond Good Intentions: Implementing the Kampala Convention’, Forced Migration Review, p53.
111  Ibid
112  Ibid.
113  Lecamwasam M, (2014), ‘The Internally Displaced in South Asia: Lessons from Kampala’, Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the 
Law, 15 (1&2), p165-166.
114  Kuwali D, (2013), ‘From Durable Solutions to Holistic Solutions: Prevention of Displacement in Africa’, African Journal of Legal Studies, 6, 
p272.
115  Ibid, p273.
116  Ferris E, Mooney E & Stark C, (2011), ‘From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement’, The 
Brookings Institution – London School of Economics Project on Internal Displacement.                                     
117  Ibid, pxii.
118  Ibid, p22.
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text of contemporary post-conflict Iraq, it is easy to understand why displacement within Iraq 
is ongoing, particularly within the Disputed Territories. Not only do Iraqi institutions suffer from 
corruption, dysfunction and lack of capacity, the GoI, over the past sixteen years, has also been 
completely consumed by consecutive and overlapping conflicts such as conflict with the KRG 
over the Disputed Territories, eradicating ISIS, battling a complex insurgency, reducing tensions 
between different sectarian and ethnic groups, and generally struggling to maintain state mo-
nopoly on violence as a means of maintaining the establishment which underpins the Iraqi state. 
In short, both the GoI and the KRG have been tackling the symptoms of displacement rather 
than addressing the causes.
The Kampala Convention approaches prevention of displacement from a collective perspective, 
focusing on the ESC rights of communities, rather than individual rights, and requiring states 
parties to prevent and mitigate displacement ‘by eradicating the root causes, such as persistent 
and recurrent conflicts and the effects of natural disasters.’119 Article 3(b) provides that states 
parties must ‘prevent political, social, cultural and economic exclusion and marginalization, 
that are likely to cause displacement of populations or persons by virtue of their social identity, 
religion or political opinion,’ providing a particularly robust approach to ESC rights. The Conven-
tion therefore ‘approaches displacement from a responsibility standpoint’120 in contrast to the 
GPs. This approach is best demonstrated through the fact that the Kampala Convention ‘places 
an obligation on state and non-state actors alike to respect, promote and respect the rights of 
IDPs’,121 imposing criminal sanctions on groups or corporations that violate this provision. De-
veloping the argument for the nexus between exclusion and marginalization and displacement 
(or prevention of displacement), Eelco Kessels and Christina Nemr, explain that ‘heavy-handed 
security responses, arbitrary implementation of laws or regulations and a lack of access to justice 
can contribute to grievances that raise tensions between communities and governments.’122 The 
web of negative social factors these scholars identify is clearly evident within Iraq, particularly 
in relation to the Disputed Territories and securitization of Sunni-male IDPs who are often per-
ceived as potential ISIS-affiliates123 without evidence, potentially resulting in continued tensions, 
conflict and subsequent displacement.
Finally, by incorporating the fundamental right of IDPs not to be displaced, the Kampala Con-
vention has elevated this preventative measure of protection ‘from an ethical consideration to a 
legal duty.’124 The obligatory nature of this protection is essential in times of conflict or fragility of 
governance when certain sections of the population may otherwise be vulnerable to arbitrary, 
forced displacement.
6.3 A holistic approach to durable solutions: return is not enough
A logical starting point when examining the case of perceived ISIS-affiliates is how to integrate 
them into host communities or reintegrate them into their communities of origin. Siddiqui 
points to how the security screening process which is already well established in IDP camps can 
be utilized in order to reassure host communities and communities of return that those per-
ceived as ISIS-affiliates, are, in fact, not affiliated at all. She explains that if the screening process 
was made completely transparent and results provided to communities, a reduction in conflict 
119  Kamungi P, (2010), ‘Beyond Good Intentions: Implementing the Kampala Convention’, Forced Migration Review, 33, p53.
120  Lecamwasam M, (2014), ‘The Internally Displaced in South Asia: Lessons from Kampala’, Asia-Pacific Journal on Human Rights and the 
Law, 15 (1&2), p164.
121  Ibid.
122  Kessels E & Nemr C, (2016), ‘Countering Violent Extremism and Development Assistance: Identifying Synergies, Obstacles and Oppor-
tunities’, Global Centre on Cooperative Strategy Policy Brief, p5
123  Higel L, (2016), ‘Iraq’s Displacement Crisis: Security and Protection’, Ceasefire Centre for Civilian Rights and Minority Rights Group Inter-
national, p11 and 20; and United Nations General Assembly, (5th April 2016), ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Internally 
Displaced Persons on his Mission to Iraq’, A/HRC/32/35/Add.1, Human Rights Council, Thirty-second session, Agenda Item 3, p12.
124  Adeola R, (2018), ‘The Kampala Convention and the Right not to be Arbitrarily Displaced’, Forced Migration Review, 59, p15.
26 Internal Displacement Research Programme Working Paper 7
would likely occur.125 This would however comprise merely a first step to securing sustainable 
integration for perceived ISIS-affiliates, with a number of other inter-related factors also playing 
an important role, as detailed below.
Any durable solutions programming must target both host community and IDPs together. Here 
a valuable lesson can be applied from the Kampala Convention: durable solutions are reliant on 
the protection of collective ESC rights, and so creation of jobs, improvement of infrastructure 
and effective, non-discriminatory provision of services are crucial to encouraging successful in-
tegration or reintegration of IDPs.126 There needs to be a shift away from the containment-based 
policies and approaches to displacement currently being implemented across Iraq, and which 
are also present to a certain extent within the three traditional durable solutions. Rather, IDPs 
should be supported in their informal, internal migration, with migration being viewed as a pos-
itive contributing factor to economic development in such circumstances, 127 particularly when 
such migration takes place against a backdrop of decreased securitization and increased so-
cio-economic assistance for communities. Such an approach, however, should not overlook the 
distinct vulnerabilities of specific groups. Long-term psycho-social assistance will be an integral 
component of durable solutions and could be implemented as a precursor to social cohesion 
programmes based upon cross-communal dialogue. 
An institutional shift away from return as the only desirable durable solution is also required, 
in order to recognise the reality for IDPs and formulate pragmatic policy response. A complete 
overhaul of policy formulation is required in Iraq, which currently implements approaches to 
displacement in a very centralized top-down approach. Rather, a coordinated, regionalized 
response is required, which enables local communities to participate in the formulation of 
responses to displacement in a bottom-up manner. This will enable the MoDM to incorporate 
lessons learned from the Kampala Convention regarding prevention of marginalization through 
the inclusion of all sectors of society, including the grassroots, who are able to offer a critical per-
spective on both the causes of, and solutions to displacement. It is vital that such a participatory 
approach employs a non-discriminative approach to consultations, and thus perceived ISIS-affili-
ates, minorities, women and youth must all be included. Such an approach is particularly import-
ant in the Disputed Territories, and both the GoI and KRG must be receptive to the message they 
receive from residents of the area, however unpalatable they may find it. Continuing instability 
and power-struggles in the territories will only serve to act as a catalyst for continued conflict 
and displacement. 
Dialogue-based initiatives and reconciliation programmes will be foundational to the success 
of establishing truly durable solutions. These initiatives should also be formulated through a 
participatory approach at community level rather than imposed in a top-down uniform manner. 
Individual communities will have distinct sets of grievances to be addressed, and the most ben-
eficial approach would be for the GoI and KRG to support tribal reconciliation processes which 
‘being cross-sectarian in their very nature…have been more efficient than the state in dealing 
with extremely violent sectarian conflicts.’128 Siddiqui notes the importance of state and tribal 
councils cooperating on peacebuilding initiatives, stating that, post-ISIS, ‘even in tribally oriented 
areas where the formal rule of law is secondary to tribal arbitration, divisions in the social fabric 
are now too great for a tribal process alone to heal.’129
125  Siddiqui N, (2018), ‘Balancing the Rights of Displaced, Returning and Remaining Populations: Learning from Iraq’, Forced Migration 
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This leads to the final, most difficult evolution required in the Iraqi state’s response to displace-
ment. Since the American invasion in 2003, sectarianism has become increasingly institutional-
ized. A change of national discourse is required at the national political level as well as among 
regional authorities and local civil society groups which emphasises the shared bonds of Iraqi 
citizenship rather than identitarian divisions. Compounding the obstacles to peacebuilding and 
durable solutions presented by institutionalized sectarianism, is the centralized nature of gov-
ernance, which due to Iraq’s ethno-sectarian and socio-economic diversity, makes a ‘diversified, 
regionalized approach [to securing durable solutions] hard to achieve.’130 
Certain facets of durable solutions should remain centralized. For example, all ANSAs should be 
made aware of their responsibilities under international law, and it should be made clear that 
they will be held criminally responsible for breach of these responsibilities, regardless of which 
region they are operating in. Likewise, all relevant government staff should be made aware of 
their protection responsibilities through provision of human rights, IDP-specific and NPD-spe-
cific training. Breaches of human rights should be investigated and tried in a non-discriminatory 
manner according to a national rights-based legislative framework which aligns with the Arab 
Charter of Human Rights and other international norms. However, provision of services, liveli-
hood creation, urban regeneration and approaches to reconciliation and integration should be 
overseen at a regional level, ensuring relevance and thus sustainability. Importantly, government 
and international stakeholders must recognise that achieving truly durable solutions will be a 
lengthy process and commit funds accordingly.
130  Van der Auweraert P, (2011), ‘Displacement and National Institutions: Reflections on the Iraqi Experience’, Middle East Institute and 
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7. Conclusion and Recommendations
The contemporary displacement landscape in Iraq poses several unique and challenging fac-
tors to be considered when striving to secure durable solutions. Protracted displacement has 
become entrenched as a norm, partly due to an exclusive focus on return, while the ongoing 
conflict between the GoI and KRG over the Disputed Territories continues to have a destabilizing 
effect, with corresponding disproportionately negative implications for minorities and minority 
IDPs and returnees. Additionally, the presence of perceived ISIS-affiliates within the IDP popula-
tion has resulted in securitization by state forces and reduction of social cohesion. 
Ferris et al. provide useful guidance on what they consider to be integral provisions of an effec-
tive national policy on displacement, which are informative for a redrafting of the Iraqi NPD. They 
describe how it should ‘encompass the various causes of displacement and address all phases 
of displacement, including actions to prevent arbitrary displacement, to ensure protection and 
assistance during displacement, and to secure durable solutions to displacement. It should also 
address the needs of specific groups.’131 Thus, in the context of Iraq, in the interests of protec-
tion, including pursual of durable solutions, IDPs who are perceived ISIS-affiliates, minorities and 
those originating from, or being resettled in, the Disputed Territories should be included within 
an updated NPD as distinct groups in need of specific forms of protection. 
As an identified group with special protection needs, perceived-ISIS affiliates should be afforded 
the following: protection from arbitrary arrest and detention; protection from restrictions on 
freedom of movement; protection from discriminatory treatment in the distribution of aid and 
provision of assistance; and supported reintegration or integration built upon long-term dia-
logue-based social cohesion initiatives.  Borrowing from the Kampala Convention, in working to 
integrate, or reintegrate, perceived ISIS-affiliates, the state should recognise its responsibility to 
prevent marginalization of any groups as a means through which to prevent further conflict and 
displacement, and so, the NPD should emphasise the necessity of including perceived ISIS-affili-
ates in consultations on durable solutions and peacebuilding policies.
The Disputed Territories pose a particularly sensitive and combustible situation, and should 
therefore be addressed as a matter of urgency in terms of immediate IDP protection, but also in 
terms of prevention of displacement. A framework should be included in an updated NPD which 
clearly designates division of roles for both the GoI and KRG in terms of security and cooperation 
in the territories, with adherence to human rights principles and IDP protection at its core. An 
updated NPD should emphasize the voluntary and assisted nature of durable solutions, with the 
introduction of impartial monitoring mechanisms to ensure that this is implemented. 
The NPD should adopt similar provisions to those in the Kampala Convention which clearly stip-
ulate the responsibilities of ANSAs, state-affiliated militias and other non-state actors with regard 
to prevention of displacement and adherence to human rights and humanitarian law. Criminal 
responsibility for breaches of these responsibilities should be clearly outlined within an updat-
ed NPD, with such criminal sanctions being applied robustly and indiscriminately as a matter of 
course for any breaches. IDP protection cannot be permitted to fall prey to corruption. 
Again, drawing from the Kampala Convention, the collective ESC rights of host communities as 
well as IDPs should addressed, but not to the detriment of the distinct protection needs of IDPs. 
Thus, an updated NPD should provide a framework for a participatory approach to formulating 
durable solutions, which incorporates feedback from a variety of social groups, including the 
grassroots, from both the host and IDP communities. Such feedback should be used to tailor rel-
131  Ferris E, Mooney E & Stark C, (2011), ‘From Responsibility to Response: Assessing National Approaches to Internal Displacement’, The 
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evant socio-economic initiatives for regeneration of livelihood, services and infrastructure. At the 
same time, the psycho-social needs of IDPs (and vulnerable members of the host community) 
should be addressed through long-term programmes rather than short-term policies measured 
in terms of immediate indicators.
Finally, the NPD should be introduced to relevant line ministries through comprehensive train-
ing at the least, though a preferred route would be to use the policy as the basis for IDP-specific 
national legislation, thus rendering the provisions legally binding. Furthermore, decentralization 
of implementation of the policy will be crucial. The MoDM should coordinate and monitor its 
regional implementation in order to ensure that protection mechanisms remain adhered to, but 
the defining of components for protection and durable solutions should be the remit of local 
authorities alongside local stakeholders, including marginalized groups from both the IDP and 
host community populations. An integral aspect of these components should be dialogue-based 
community reconciliation initiatives, which work towards community conflict resilience and 
community cohesion as a means of reducing future displacement.
In 2020, Iraq has the potential to significantly change the landscape for IDP protection in the 
Middle East. The Iraqi authorities should take full advantage of this opportunity in order to build 
a robust and holistic NPD which incorporates provisions from the Kampala Convention, and 
which therefore serves as an instrument for peacebuilding as well as immediate protection. 
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